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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a summary judgment rendered by the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE 1
Is the appeal of David W. Miller ("Miller") moot because the bond companies failed
to appeal the adverse judgment that resolved the issues now before the Court of Appeals in
this case and that awarded the State $50,000 under the bond?
Standard of Review. Because the suggestion of mootness in an appeal does not arise
until after an appeal, the issue was not before the trial court, and, therefore, there is no
corresponding standard of review. See Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co.,
659 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1983) ("An appeal is moot if during the pendency of the appeal
circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief
requested impossible or of no legal effect.").
ISSUE 2
Was the trial court correct in concluding that as a political subdivision of the State,
Salt Lake County is not subject to the Health Spa Services Protection Act (the "Act"), Utah
Code Ann. §§ 13-23-1 to -7 (1992), and the regulations promulgated under the Act (the
"Rules"), Utah Admin. Code Rl 52-7-1 to -7 (1990)?
Standard of Review. The trial court's determination of whether or not Salt Lake
County is subject to the Act and its corresponding rules is a question of law. Therefore, this
issue is reviewed under the "correction of error" standard. See Ong Int % Inc. v. 11th Avenue
Corporation, 850 P.2d 447,455 (Utah 1993); State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968,969 (Utah App.
1994) ("This court 'review[s] questions of law under a correction of error standard, without
2

deference to the trial court/") (quoting State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App.
1992)).
ISSUE 3
Was the trial court correct in concluding that, even if Salt Lake County were subject
to the Act and the rules promulgated under the Act, the County is not obligated to honor the
unexpired membership contracts of Quest Sport & Fitness ("Quest")?
Standard of Review. The trial court's determination of whether or not the rules
require the County to honor the membership contracts even though it did not purchase the
facility from Quest is a question of law. Therefore, this issue is reviewed under the
"correction of error" standard. See Shipler, 869 P.2d at 969.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The following statutory and regulatory provisions, whose interpretation is
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal, are set out verbatim in
Addendums A and B respectively: the Health Spa Services Protection Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 13-23-1 to-7 (1992), and the rules promulgated under the Act, Utah Admin. CodeR1527-1 to -7 (1990). *
]

The events which are the subject of this appeal occurred on or around January 3,
1995. At that time, the Act in effect was set forth in the 1992 Replacement Volume of the
Utah Code. The Act was not amended thereafter until May 1,1995. Therefore, all reference
to the Act will be to the Act as contained in the 1992 Replacement Volume. Addendum 1
to Miller's Brief includes the Act as amended on May 1, 1995, and therefore, it is not the
applicable version of the Act.
The rules in effect in January of 1995 were last amended in 1990. Therefore, all
reference to the rules will be to the rules as amended in 1990. For purposes of clarity,
argument in this brief will hereafter refer to the Act and rules in the present tense.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Relevant Facts
Boyd Jentzsch operated a health spa known as Quest Sport & Fitness ("Quest") in
South Jordan, Utah from 1993 to 1995. R. at 442. Jentzsch did not own the facility where
he operated the health spa, but leased the premises from the Country Court House Trust
("CCH Trust"). R. at 443. In accordance with the Health Spa Services Protection Act,
Jentzsch obtained a $50,000 bond from Homestead Insurance Company and International
Special Events & Recreation Association (hereafter collectively referred to as "Homestead").
R. at 443. The bond was effective for a term of one year, beginning August 10, 1994, and
required Homestead to pay the Utah Division of Consumer Protection up to $50,000 in the
event of any default by Quest in its obligations under the Act. R. at 444. Before it would
issue the bond, Homestead required that Quest obtain a personal guarantee of the bond by
someone acceptable to Homestead. R. at 444. Accordingly, Quest secured the personal
guarantee of the appellant, David W. Miller ("Miller"). R. at 444.
On January 3, 1995, Quest ceased doing business by virtue of actions taken by the
trustee in the bankruptcy of Quest Sport & Fitness, Inc. R. at 445. After Quest's closure,
health spa members could no longer access the health spa, nor did Quest provide its members
with an alternate health spa location. R. at 445. At the time of Quest's closure, there existed,
and there now exists, at least $50,000 in outstanding obligations to health spa members
holding valid, unexpired membership contracts with Quest for health spa services. R. at 445.
Subsequent to Quest's closure, the Division notified Homestead of Quest's default under the
4

Act and demanded payment under the bond. R. at 446. Notwithstanding the Division's
demands, neither Quest nor Homestead has submitted any funds for the purpose of refunding
the unused portion of membership fees paid by Quest health spa members. R. at 446.
More than five months after Quest's closure, CCH Trust sold to Salt Lake County the
facility that previously had been leased to Quest. R. at 446. The contract for the sale of the
facility made no references to health spa membership contracts. R. at 446. After its purchase
of the facility from CCH Trust, the County opened the facility, providing the same type of
services that had been provided by Quest. R. at 446.
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Trial Court
In August of 1995, the Utah Division of Consumer Protection (the ffStaten) filed an
action in Third District Court against Quest and Homestead. The State sought to recover
$50,000 under the bond on behalf of Quest members holding valid, unexpired membership
contracts at the time Quest ceased doing business in January of 1995.
In October of 1995, Miller, who had personally guaranteed the bond issued by
Homestead, filed an action in Third District Court against the State and Salt Lake County for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Miller sought an order from the trial court declaring that
the rules promulgated under the Health Spas Services Protection Act required Salt Lake
County to honor the Quest membership contracts by virtue of its purchase of the health spa
facility from CCH Trust. Miller also sought an injunction against the State from collecting
or attempting to collect on the bond pending the outcome of the declaratory action.

5

Approximately one year later, pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the stipulation of the parties, Miller's action for declaratory and injunctive
relief was consolidated with the State's action to recover on the bond. Thereafter, the parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment and argument was heard. On June 2, 1997, the
trial court granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment. In its judgment, attached as
Addendum C, the Court forfeited the bond and awarded the State judgment against
Homestead in the amount of $50,000 for the benefit of former Quest members who incurred
damages as a result of Quest's closure and failure to refund to its members the unused
portion of their membership fees. The trial court also dismissed the complaint of Miller
against the State and Salt Lake County.
On July 1,1997, Miller appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from the dismissal of his
action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Homestead did not perfect an appeal from the
adverse judgment awarded the State. In July of 1997, the State filed a Motion for Summary
Disposition seeking summary affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of Miller's complaint.
The Utah Supreme Court denied the State's motion and the appeal was thereafter transferred
to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Miller's appeal must fail for several reasons. First, Miller's appeal should be
dismissed because of mootness. Miller appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing his
action to enjoin the State from collecting on the bond from Homestead and declaring that the
Rules require Salt Lake County to honor the unexpired membership contracts of Quest. His
6

appeal, however, is moot because Homestead, against whom judgment was rendered in favor
of the State, failed to perfect an appeal. Inasmuch as the State's case against Homestead is
now final and fully enforceable, and the issues in the Homestead case are identical to those
in this appeal, Miller is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from attacking the
judgment in Homestead in a separate action. This Court cannot grant Miller effective relief.
Therefore, Miller's appeal is moot and should be dismissed.
Even if Miller's appeal is not dismissed, the trial court's decision should be affirmed
on the merits for two fundamental reasons. First, the County is not subject to the Health Spa
Services Act or to the rules promulgated under the Act. The Act applies only to health spas
and health spa services. The Act specifically exempts from its definition of a "health spa"
political subdivisions of the State, and it defines "health spa services" as those services
provided by a health spa. Therefore, by definition, the County can neither operate a health
spa nor provide health spa services. No provision in the Act exists which purports to regulate
entities other than health spas, and, therefore, the County is not subject to the Act. Moreover,
because an agency may not promulgate regulations that are contrary to or exceed the scope
of the statute from which they are derived, the rules promulgated under the Act cannot be
interpreted to regulate Salt Lake County.
Finally, even if the County were subject to the Act and the rules promulgated under
the Act, the rules nevertheless would not require the County to honor the unexpired
membership contracts of Quest. Miller's reliance on the first sentence in Rule 152-7-4.F is
misplaced. That provision contemplates the sale of an ongoing concern. In this case, the
7

health spa ceased doing business altogether by virtue of actions taken by the trustee in
bankruptcy. Salt Lake County purchased the facility from CCH Trust more than five months
after the health spa closed. Where a health spa ceases doing business, Rule 152-7-5 must be
applied. That rule requires that upon the closure of a health spa for any reason, the health spa
must offer appropriate refunds to all members holding valid, unexpired memberships.
Moreover, even if Rule 152-7-4 .F applied, the rule requires the purchaser of a facility
(Salt Lake County) to replace the seller (CCH Trust) as a party to any unexpired membership
contracts. However, because CCH Trust merely leased the premises to Quest and had no
interest in the health spa itself, it was never a party to the Quest membership contracts.
Therefore, no membership contracts existed involving Quest in which the County could
replace CCH Trust as a party.
ARGUMENT
I.

MILLER'S APPEAL IS MOOT BECAUSE HOMESTEAD FAILED TO
APPEAL THE ADVERSE JUDGMENT THAT RESOLVED THE
ISSUES NOW BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE
AND THAT AWARDED THE STATE $50,000 UNDER THE BOND
The State filed an action in Third District Court seeking $50,000 from Homestead

under the bond it issued on behalf of Quest ^Homestead" case). Miller had personally
guaranteed the bond, and, therefore, could assert the defenses available to Homestead. See
Mead Corp v. Dixon Paper Co., 907 P.2d 1179, 1183 n.4 (Utah App. 1995). However,
instead of joining as a party in Homestead, Miller filed an action to enjoin the State from
collecting on the bond. In his action, Miller also sought an order from the trial court
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declaring that, pursuant to the health spa regulations, Salt Lake County was required to honor
the unexpired membership contracts of Quest members.
After the two actions were joined under rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

Both Miller and

Homestead, who were represented by the same attorney, argued that the rules require the
County to honor the Quest memberships by virtue of its purchase of the facility from CCH
Trust who had leased the premises to Quest. R. at 442. The parties did not dispute that
Homestead would be required to pay on the bond if the County is not obligated to honor the
Quest memberships. Therefore, the issue in the State's motion for summary judgment
against Homestead was the same as that now before the Court in Miller's appeal: whether
or not the rules require the County to honor the Quest memberships.
Unlike Miller, however, Homestead did not appeal the summary judgment of the trial
court. Accordingly, the State has a valid, enforceable judgment against Homestead that is
no longer subject to attack. As such, resolution of the issues in Homestead render this action
moot. See Salt Lake City v. Utah Tax Comm V?, 813 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1991). Because
the same issue has already been litigated and a final judgment rendered, Miller is now barred
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from obtaining the relief he requests.
"Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, involves two different causes of action and
only bars those issues in the second litigation necessarily decided in the first."' State ex rel
T.l, 945 P.2d 158,163 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State ex rel Dep V of Social Services, 742
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P.2d 114, 116 (Utah App. 1987)). As observed by this Court, "Utah courts have developed
a four-part test for the application of collateral estoppel:
'1. Was the issue decided in a prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question?
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?
3. Was the party against whom the plea was asserted a party or in privity
with a party to the prior adjudication?
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and fairly litigated?9"
Id. at 163-64. Applying the four-part test to this matter, it becomes apparent that Miller's
action is now barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
First, the issue decided by the trial court in the Homestead case-whether or not the
rules required Salt Lake County to honor the Quest memberships-was not only identical to
the issue in Miller's action, but was decided by the trial court in the same decision. R. at
448-49. Second, a final judgment has been rendered in the State's case against Homestead
and an appeal was never perfected within the applicable appeal period. Third, although
Miller was not a party in the State's action against Homestead, as a personal guarantor to
Homestead's bond, Miller was in privity with Homestead. "A person is in privity with
another when that person i s so identified in interest with another that the same legal rights
are represented.'" Id. at 163 (quoting State ex rel Dep't of Social Services, 742 P.2d at
117)). The defenses available to Homestead in the State's action are the same asserted by
Miller in this matter. In this action, Miller is merely asserting the defenses of Homestead as
guarantor of Homestead's obligation on the bond. See Mead Corp., 907 P.2d at 1183 n.4.
The interests of the two parties are, in fact, identical. If Homestead is required to pay on the
10

bond, Miller will be required to pay Homestead under his personal guarantee. Finally, the
issue in Homestead was competently, fully, and fairly litigated. The parties filed a set of
stipulated facts, submitted appropriate memoranda in their cross motions for summary
judgment, and were afforded adequate opportunity to be heard in oral argument. Indeed,
counsel for Miller also acted as counsel for Homestead. R. at 442.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that" [a]n issue on appeal is considered moot when
'the requested relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.91' State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840,
841 (Utah 1994) (quoting Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)); accord
Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 832 F.2d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir.
1987) (f,[W]here a controversy has become moot by subsequent events which preclude a
grant of effective relief, the appeal should be dismissed as moot."). As demonstrated above,
Miller's action for injunctive relief is now barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In
light of the foregoing, addressing this appeal would be no more than rendering an advisory
opinion, which is against judicial policy. See Sims, 881 P.2d at 841. Accordingly, Miller's
appeal is now moot and should therefore be dismissed.
II.

AS A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE, SALT LAKE
COUNTY IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE HEALTH SPA SERVICES
PROTECTION ACT OR THE REGULATIONS PROMULGATED
UNDER THE ACT
Even if the Court concluded that Miller's appeal is not moot, it nevertheless should

be affirmed on the merits. The Health Spa Services Protection Act is a simple and
straightforward law that regulates health spas operating within the state. The Act requires
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health spas to obtain and maintain a bond or letter of credit. Utah Code Ann. § 13-23-5
(1992); see also Utah Code Ann. § 13-23-6 (1992) (setting forth exemptions to the bond
requirements). The purpose of the bond requirement is to protect "any consumer who incurs
damages as the result of the health spa's violation of [the Act], or as the result of the health
spa's going out of business or relocating and failing to offer an alternate location within 15
miles.,f Utah Code Ann. § 13-23-5 (1992). The Act also imposes certain requirements on
contracts for health spa services and provides grounds for the rescission of health spa
contracts. Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-23-3; -4 (1992). This is the extent of the Act's regulation.
No provisions exist imposing requirements on entities other than health spas. Application
of the Act, therefore, is limited to health spas and health spa services.
The threshold inquiry, therefore, is what entities fall within the definition of a health
spa and what services constitute health spa services. The Act defines a health spa as follows:
"Health spa" means any person, partnership, joint venture, corporation,
association, or other entity that, for a charge or fee, provides as one of its
primary purposes services or facilities that are purported to assist patrons to
improve their physical condition or appearance through change in weight,
weight control, treatment, dieting, aerobic conditioning, strength training, or
other exercise. It includes any establishment designated as a "reducing salon,"
"health spa," "spa," "exercise gym," "health studio," "health club," or by other
similar terms.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-23-2(3)(a) (1992). However, the Act expressly excludes from this
definition certain persons, organizations, and facilities that may otherwise fall within its
terms, including "any facility owned or operated by the state or its political subdivisions."
Utah Code Ann. § 13-23-2(3)(b)(1992). Therefore, by definition, Salt Lake County does not
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operate a health spa because it is a political subdivision of the state. Utah Const, art. XI, §
1. Moreover, the Act defines health spa services as "any service provided by a health spa,
including athletic facilities, equipment, and instruction." Utah Code Ann. § 13-23-2(4)
(1992) (emphasis added). Therefore, Salt Lake County does not provide health spa services
because it is not defined as a health spa. Thus, Salt Lake County is not subject to the Act.
Miller argues that the Act exempts Salt Lake County only from the bond
requirements. However, the plain language of the Act, which is "the best expression of
legislative intent," dictates otherwise. See Silver v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 820 P.2d 912,
914 (Utah 1991). As explained above, no provision of the Act purports to regulate entities
that are outside the definition of a health spa. Moreover, section 13-23-6 specifically
identifies those health spas that are exempt from the bond requirements of the Act. Utah
Code Ann. § 13-23-6 (1992) (entitled "Exemptions from bond or letter of credit
requirements").

Accordingly, had it been the legislature's intent to exempt political

subdivisions from only the Act's bond requirements, it would simply have included political
subdivisions in section 13-23-6. The legislature did not do so, choosing instead to exempt
political subdivisions from the entire scope of the Act.
Nor can the regulations promulgated by the Division under the Act be interpreted to
impose requirements on the County. To do so would improperly expand the scope of the
Act. As observed by this Court, "[a]n administrative agency's authority to promulgate
regulations is limited to those regulations which are consonant with the statutory framework,
and neither contrary to the statute nor beyond its scope." Crowther v. Nationwide Mutual
13

Insurance Company, 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah App. 1988); see also Dusty's, Inc. v.
Auditing Division of the State Tax Comm 'n, 842 P.2d 868,872 n.5 (Utah 1992) (quoting with
approval the holding in Crowther). Consequently, the Division cannot impose requirements
upon entities other than health spas.
The lower court, therefore, correctly held that the rules promulgated under the Act are
invalid to the extent they appear to impose obligations upon Salt Lake County as a political
subdivision of the State. R. at 448. Indeed, an examination of the rules reveals that they do
not purport to impose obligations on entities other than health spas.

Rule 152-7-2

specifically provides that the "rules shall apply to the conduct of every Health Spa Business
within the State of Utah." Utah Admin. Code R152-7-2 (1990). Therefore, even though a
political subdivision of the State may purchase a health spa business or facility, the rules
expressly limit their application to health spas.

III. EVEN IF SALT LAKE COUNTY WERE SUBJECT TO THE ACT AND
THE RULES PROMULGATED UNDER THE ACT, THE COUNTY IS
NOT OBLIGATED TO HONOR THE QUEST MEMBERSHIP
CONTRACTS
A.

Because Quest Ceased Doing Business Altogether, the Rules Governing the
Closure of a Health Spa Would Apply to Quest Rather than the Rules Governing
the Sale of a Health Spa.
Assuming, arguendo, that the rules promulgated by the Division could expand the

intended scope of the Act, Miller's reliance on Rule 152-7-4.F is nevertheless misplaced.
Rule 152-7-4.F provides as follows:

14

The purchaser of a health spa facility shall replace the Seller as a party to any
unexpired Membership Contract and shall honor all Membership Contracts
of the pur chasedfacility in effect at the time of purchase, pursuant to Section
13-23-5(2) of the Act. In the event a Health Spa Facility shall be sold under
circumstances which will result in its closure and the purchaser shall not
operate a Health Spa Facility within 15 miles thereof, purchaser must notify
Members of such closure in writing within 10 days of the date of sale.
Members may cancel their outstanding Membership Contracts or may choose
to continue their Membership Contract in force. Notice of such election be in
writing mailed to the purchaser within 30 days of the receipt of notice of
closure of the acquired Health Spa Facility.
Utah Admin. Code R152-7-4.F (1990) (emphasis added). Miller relies on the first sentence
of Rule 152-7-4.F. However, this provision contemplates the sale, rather than the closure,
of a health spa facility. In this case, the health spa did not simply change ownership by virtue
of a sale, but closed business for more than five months due to certain actions taken by the
trustee in bankruptcy. Accordingly, Quest was subject, instead, to the requirements of Rule
152-7-5, which contemplates the closure of a health spa facility. Rule 152-7-5 provides in
relevant part as follows:
In the event a Health Spa Facility shall, for any reason, close, discontinue
normal operations or otherwise cease to do business while having outstanding
obligations to provide membership services to members holding valid
membership contracts, the Health Spa Facility must offer, in writing, to rescind
all such membership contracts and to refund the unused portion of all
Member's membership fees. Such written offer of rescission shall establish the
procedure and time limit for acceptance of the rescission offer and obtaining
the desired refund.
Utah Admin. Code Rl52-7-5.A (1990). Having ceased to do business, Quest was obligated
to provide refunds to all members holding valid membership contracts at the time of closure.
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Therefore, the lower court was correct in concluding that "[e]ven if the Court were to
assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the Act, because the purchase of the facility
occurred a full five (5) months after its closure, the regulations governing closure of a facility
applied rather than the regulations governing the purchase of a facility." R. at 449. This
conclusion is not only supported by a fair reading of the regulations, but also by the equities
to health spa members affected by such a closure. Indeed, a finding to the contrary would
place health spa members in the predicament of waiting for the health spa to reopen, whether
it be in two weeks, five months, or years, while in the meantime being without the health spa
services for which they contracted. Health spa members would be forced into a decision of
how long to wait for the health spa to reopen before joining another. If the health spa is
reopened after the consumer has opted to join another health spa, the consumer would then
be in the unnecessary and costly position of having paid for memberships in two different
health spas.
B.

Even if the Rules Governing the Sale of a Health Spa Applied, the Rules Do Not
Require the County to Honor Quest Membership Contracts Because Quest Was
Not a Party to the Sale.
Assuming, arguendo, that Salt Lake County is subject to the Act and the rules

governing the sale of a health spa, Rule 152-7-4.F nevertheless does not require the County
to honor the membership contracts of Quest, which was not even a party to the sale of the
facility. Miller argues that this rule requires the purchaser of a health spa facility to honor
the unexpired membership contracts of the health spa business, whether or not the owner of
the health spa facility has any interest in the membership contracts. Brief of Appellant at 1416

15. A close examination of the rule, however, reveals that Miller's interpretation is
erroneous.
The rule requires the purchaser of a health spa facility to "replace the Seller as a party
to any unexpired Membership Contract." Utah Admin. Code R152-7-4.F (1990). In this
case, the seller of the facility was CCH Trust and the purchaser of the facility was Salt Lake
County. Therefore, the rule would require that Salt Lake County (purchaser) replace CCH
Trust (seller) as a party to any unexpired membership contracts. However, CCH Trust
merely leased the premises to Quest, and therefore, was not a party to the Quest membership
contracts. As a result, the County cannot replace CCH Trust as a party to the Quest
membership contracts because CCH Trust was not a party to those contracts.
Interpreting the rule in this manner is not a case of exalting adherence to form over
substance, as Miller suggests. Brief of Appellant at 14-15. Certainly, "[it is the purpose of
the law, and of the court in administering it, to do justice and to look through form to
substance when necessary to accomplish that purpose." Dixon v. Stoddard, 627 P.2d 83, 87
(Utah 1981). However, it is not the purpose of the Act to impose obligations on a party that
has no interest in the operation of the health spa itself. Therefore, the lower court was correct
in concluding that, even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the
Act, the County nevertheless would not be required to honor the Quest membership contracts
under Rule 152-7-4.F. R. at 448.
Finally, Miller's reading of the rules completely ignores other provisions of the Act.
Utah courts have consistently held that "a statute should be construed as a whole, and its
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terms should be construed to be harmonious with each other and the overall objective of the
statute.M W&G Company v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755, 768
(Utah App. 1990). Miller's reading of the rules ignores section 13-23-5(5) of the Act, which
provides as follows:
If a health spa changes ownership, ceases operation, or relocates and fails
to offer an alternate location within 15 miles, the health spa is subject to the
requirements of this section as if it were a new health spa coming into being
at the time the health spa changed ownership. The former owner may not
release, cancel, or terminate his liability under any bond or letter of credit
previously filed with the division, unless:
(a) the new owner has filed a new bond or letter of credit for the
benefit of consumers covered under the previous owner's bond or letter
of credit; or
(b) the former owner has refunded all unearned payments to
consumers.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-23-5(5) (1992). It is undisputed that (1) the County is not required to
file a bond (see Brief of Appellant at 9), and (2) neither Quest nor Homestead have submitted
appropriate refunds to former Quest members. R. at 446. Accordingly, Homestead is not
released from its bond and must make payment under the bond for appropriate refunds since
Quest failed to issue refunds to its members upon closure. See Utah Admin. Code R152-75.C (1990).
CONCLUSION
Because Miller's appeal is now moot by virtue of Homestead's failure to appeal the
State's judgment, this Court should dismiss the appeal. If, on the other hand, the Court does
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not dismiss the appeal, the Court should nevertheless affirm the lower court's decision
dismissing the complaint of the appellant, David W. Miller.
Because the issues related to the Health Spa Services Protection Act have not been
addressed by the Court before, oral argument and a published opinion is requested.
DATED this _ 3 ^ day of February, 1998.

JAN GRAHAM,
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

J^fgfey/S^ay (Bar No. £852)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah
DOUGLAS R. SHORT,
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY

Brendan P. McCujJagh (Bar No. 7251)
Special Deput^County Attorney
Attorneys ftirAppellee, Salt Lake County
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Addendum A

13-22-14

COMMERCE AND TRADE

13-22-14. Accuracy not guaranteed.
(1) By issuing a permit or by providing forms for an information card, the
state does not guarantee the accuracy of any representation contained on the
permit or information card, nor does it warrant that any statement made by
the holder of the permit or information card is truthful. The state makes no
certification as to the charitable worthiness of any organization on whose
behalf a solicitation is made nor as to the moral character of the holder of the
permit or information card.
(2) The following statement shall appear on each permit and information
card in uppercase letters, in close proximity to the seal or acknowledgment
required under Subsection 13-22-10(l)(d): THE STATE OF UTAH DOES
NOT WARRANT THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS
CARD IS TRUE."
History: C. 1953, 13-22-14, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 122, I 15.

CHAPTER 23
HEALTH SPAS
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was enacted as Title 13, Chapter 22 but, because of duplicate numbering at the 1987 session, was renumbered as Chapter 23.
Section
13-23-1.
13-23-2.
13-23-3.
13-23-4.
13-23-5.

Short title.
Definitions.
Contracts for health spa services.
Rescission.
Bond or letter of credit required.

Section
13-23-6.
13-23-7.

Exemptionsfrombond or letter of
credit requirement.
Enforcement — Costs and attorney's fees.

13-23-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Health Spa Services Protection Act."
History: C. 1953, 13-22-1, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 105, $ 5; recompiled as C. 1953,
13-23-1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Liability of proprietor of private
gymnasium, reducing salon, or similar health
club for injury to patron, 79 A.L.R.4th 127.
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13-23-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Consumer" means a purchaser of health spa services for valuable
consideration.
(2) "Division" means Division of Consumer Protection.
(3) (a) "Health spa" means any person, partnership, joint venture, corporation, association, or other -entity that, for a charge or fee, provides as one of its primary purposes services or facilities that are
purported to assist patrons to improve their physical condition or
appearance through change in weight, weight control, treatment,
dieting, aerobic conditioning, strength training, or other exercise. It
includes any establishment designated as a "reducing salon," "health
spa," "spa," "exercise gym," "health studio," "health club," or by other
similar terms.
(b) "Health spa" does not include:
(i) any exempt organization as defined in Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code;
(ii) any facility operated by a licensed physician at which the
physician engages in the practice of medicine;
(iii) any facility operated by a health care provider, hospital,
intermediate care facility, or skilled nursing care facility;
(iv) any public or private school, college, or university;
(v) any facility owned or operated by the state or its political
subdivisions; or
(vi) any facility owned or operated by the United States or its
political subdivisions.
(4) "Health spa services" means any service provided by a health spa,
including athletic facilities, equipment, and instruction.
History: C. 1953, 13-22-2, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 105, § 6; recompiled as C. 1953,
13-23-2; L. 1988, ch. 43, 5 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective March 9,1988, rewrote Subsecturn (3)(b)(i), which had read "any nonprofit

organization," and made a minor stylistic
change.
Federal Law. — Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, referred to in Subsection
(3)(b)(i), is 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

13-23-3. Contracts for health spa services.
(1) Any contract for the sale of health spa services shall be in writing. The
written contract shall constitute the entire agreement between the consumer
and the health spa.
(2) The health spa shall provide the consume* with a fully completed copy
of the contract at the time of its execution. The copy shall show the date of the
transaction and the name and address of the health spa.
(3) No contract shall have a term in excess of 36 months, but the contract
may provide that the consumer may exercise an option to renew the term
after its expiration.
(4) The contract or an attachment to it shall clearly state any rules of the
health spa that apply to the consumer's use of its facilities and services and
cancellation and refund policies of the health spa.
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History: C. 1953, 13*22-3, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 105, § 7; recompiled as C. 1953,
13-23-3.

13-23-4. Rescission.
(1) A consumer may rescind a contract for the purchase of health spa services if he enters into the contract and gives value at a time when the health
spa is not fully operational and available for use, and if the health spa does
not become fully operational and available for use within 60 days after the
date of the contract.
(2) A consumer's right to rescind his contract under this section continues
for three business days after the health spa becomes fully operational and
available for use.
(3) A consumer who rescinds his contract under this section is entitled to a
refund of any payments he has made, less the reasonable value of any health
spa services he actually received or $25, whichever is less. The preparation
and processing of the contract and other documents are not considered to be
health spa services that are deductible under this subsectionfromany refundable amount.
(4) Any rescission of a contract under this section is effective upon the
health spa's receipt of written notice of the consumer's intent to rescind the
contract. The notice may be delivered by hand or mailed by certified mail
postmarked no later than midnight of the third day after the health spa
becomes fully operational and available for use.
History: C. 1953, 13-22-4, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 105, § 8; recompiled as C. 1953,
13-23-4.

13-23-5. Bond or letter of credit required.
(1) Each health spa shall obtain and maintain either a performance bond
issued by a surety authorized to transact surety business in this state or an
irrevocable letter of credit issued by a financial institution authorized to do
business in this state. The bond or letter of credit shall be payable to the
division for the benefit of any consumer who incurs damages as the result of
the health spa's violation of this chapter, or as the result of the health spa's
going out of business or relocating and failing to offer an alternate location
within 15 miles. The division may recoverfromthe bond or letter of credit the
costs of collecting and distributing funds under this section, up to 10% of the
face value of the bond or letter of credit, but only if the consumers have fully
recovered their damages first. The total liability of the issuer of the bond or
letter of credit may not exceed the amount of the bond or letter of credit.
(2) The minimum principal amount of the bond or letter of credit required
under Subsection (1) shall be based on the number of unexpired contracts for
health spa services to which the health spa is a party, in accordance with the
following schedule:
Number of Contracts
Principal Amount of
with an Unexpired Term
Bond or Letter of Credit
Exceeding 90 Days
$10,000
500 or fewer
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Number of Contracts
Principal Amount of
with an Unexpired Term
Bond or Letter of Credit
Exceeding 90 Days
$20,000
501 to 1,000
30,000
1,001 to 1,500
40,000
1,501 to 2,000
50,000
2,001 or more
(3) Each health spa shall obtain the bond or letter of credit and furnish a
certified copy of the bond or letter of credit to the division prior to selling,
offering or attempting to sell, soliciting the sale of, or becoming a party to any
contract to provide health spa services. A health spa is considered to be in
compliance with this section only if the proof provided to the division shows
that the bond or letter of credit is current.
(4) Each health spa shall maintain accurate records of the bond or letter of
credit and of any payments made, due, or to become due to the issuer and shall
open the records to inspection by the division at any time during normal
business hours.
(5) If a health spa changes ownership, ceases operation, or relocates and
fails to offer an alternate location within 15 miles, the health spa is subject to
the requirements of this section as if it were a new health spa coming into
being at the time the health spa changed ownership. The former owner may
not release, cancel, or terminate his liability under any bond or letter of credit
previously filed with the division, unless:
(a) the new owner has filed a new bond or letter of credit for the benefit
of consumers covered under the previous owner's bond or letter of credit;
or
(b) the former owner has refunded all unearned payments to consumers.
History: C. 1953, 13-22*5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 105, § 9; recompiled as C. 1953,
13-23-5; L. 1991, ch. 128, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, efifective April 29, 1991, in Subsection
CD added the phrase beginning "or as the resuit" at the end of the second sentence and

added the next-to-last sentence;
and substituted the language
ending nthe health spa is
W
subject" for A change in the ownership of a
health spa subjects the health spa" in the first
sentence in the introductory paragraph of Subsection (5).

13-23*6. Exemptions from bond or letter of credit requirement.
(1) A health spa is exempt from the application of Section 13-23-5 if:
(a) all payments to the health spa for which each consumer is obligated
at any one time, including down payments, enrollment fees, membership
fees, or any other payments to the health spa do not exceed $100; and
(b) the term of each contract, including any complimentary, compensatory, or other extension does not exceed 90 days.
(2) A health spa which offers no paid-in-full membership, but only memberships paid for by installment contracts is exemptfromthe application of Section 13-23-5 if:
(a) each contract contains the following clause: "If this health spa
ceases operation and fails to offer an alternate location within 15 miles,
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no further payments under this contract shall be due to anyone, including
any purchaser of any note associated with or contained in this contract.";
(b) all payments due under each contract, including down payments,
enrollment fees, membership fees, or any other payments to the health
spa, are in equal monthly installments spread over the entire term of the
contract; and
(c) the term of each contract is clearly stated and is not capable of being
extended.
History: C 1953, 13-22-6, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 105, § 10; recompiled as C. 1953,
13-23-6; L. 1991, ch. 128, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1991, designated the
former introductory language as part of Subsection (1), inserted the introductory language
in Subsection (2), and made related changes.

13-23-7. Enforcement — Costs and attorney's fees.
The division may, on behalf of any consumer or on its own behalf, file an
action for injunctive relief, damages, or both in order to enforce this chapter.
In addition to any relief granted, the division is entitled to an award for
reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and reasonable investigative expenses.
History: C. 1953, 13-22-7, enacted by L.
1987, ch, 105, i 11; recompiled as C. 1953,
13-23-7.

CHAPTER 24
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
Section
13-24-1.
13-24-2.
13-24-3.
13-24-4.
13-24-5.

Section
13-24-6.
13-24-7.
13-24-8.
13-24-9.

Short title.
Definitions.
Injunctive reliefl
Damages.
Attorneys' fees.

Preservation of secrecy.
Statute of limitations.
Effect on other law.
Uniformity of application and
construction.

13-24-L Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Trade Secrets Act."
History: C. 1953, 13-24-1, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 60, ft L
Uniform Laws. — Jurisdictions that have
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,

Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 60, § 10
makes the act effective on May 1, 1989.
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Addendum B

R152-7. Utali Health Spa Services.
R152-7-1. Authority.
R152-7-2
Scope and Applicability.
Rl 52-7-3. Definitions.
R152-7-4. Contracts for Health Spa Services.
R152-7-5. Rescission.
R152-7-6. Bond or Letter of Credit Required.
R152-7-7. Enforcement.
R152-7-1. Authority.
These Rules are promulgated in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46a-3, and
Section 13-2-5, Utafi Code Ann. (1953), as amended, to prescribe for the administration of the
Utah Health SpaAct, Section 13-23-1, etseq., Utali Code Ann. (1953), as amended,'the 'Act'.
R152-7-2. Scope and Applicability.
Tliese rules shall apply to the conduct of every Health Spa Business within the State of Utali.
R152-7-3. Definitions.
A. 'Advance Sales,' stiall mean sales of membership contracts on any date prior to tlie date
a health spa facility shall be open and available to provide services to purchasers.
B 'Bond' or 'Letter of Credit' shall mean an instrument containing a promise from a third
pony to pay to tlie Division of Consumer Protection for the benefit of purchasers of membership
contracts the dollar value of the unused portion of such purchaser's membership in tlie event
the health spa facility shall be unable to or refuse to provide health services pursuant to sucli
Membership Contract.
C 'Costs' sliall mean those costs incurred by the Division m investigating complaints,
administering rescission of membership contracts or fulfilling its responsibUUies under the Utali
Health Spa Act or Rules promulgated thereunder.
D 'Department' sliall mean the Department of Commerce of the State of Utali.
£
'Division' shall mean the Division of Consumer Protection of the Department of
Commerce of the State of Utalu
F. 'Health Spa Business'shall mean the business of buying, operating and selling health spa
facilities and shall include all acts related thereto.

G. 'Health Spa Facility' shall mean the physical facilities at which the services of a health
spa business are provided to its members.
H. 'Member9 shall mean the purchaser of a Membership contract pursuant to which the
member anticipates receipt of health spa services in exchange for consideration given by sucii
purchaser.
I. 'Membership Contract' shall mean a legally binding obligation pursuant to which a
purchaser agrees to give consideration in exchange for membership privileges which the seller
shall be obligated to provide.
J. 'Rescission' shall mean the process of canceling a membership contract and refunding to
the purchaser thereof the dollar value of the consideration paid for services whicli have not been
provided as of the date of cancellation.
Rl5'2-7-4. Contracts for Health Spa Services.
A. Prior to selling or attempting to sell a Membership Contract, the following documentation
must be fded with the Division:
1. Name of owner(s) of the Health Spa Facility.
2 Notice of intent to sell memberships.
3. The original or a certified copy of the Bond or Letter of Credit which will secure
purchaser's Membership Contract. The amount of such surety shall be based upon the number
and cost of memberships offered as per Section 13-23-5(2), of the Act.
B. Each Membership Contract shall contain a provision, printed in all capital letters which
reads substantially as follows: 'IN THE EVENT THE HEALTH SPA FACILITY CLOSES
AND ANOTHER HEALTH SPA FACILITY OPERATED BY THE SELLER, ORASSIGNS
OF THE SELLER, OF THIS CONTRACT IS NOT A VAILABLE WITHIN A FIFTEEN (15)
MILE RADIUS OF THE LOCATION THE MEMBER INTENDS TO PATRONIZE,
SELLER WILL REFUND TO MEMBER A PRORATA SHARE OF THE MEMBERSHIP
COST, BASED UPON THE UNUSED MEMBERSHIP TIME REMAINING ACCORDING
TO THE CONTRACT9
C. All Membership Contracts sold prior to opening of the health spa facility shall allow the
buyer a three (3) day right of rescission in accordance with Section 13-23-4 of the Act, or
Section 13-ll-4(m) of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
D. The dollar value of a Membership Contract shall be clearly stated on the face of the
contract.
E. In any event, no Membership Contract sliall be sold which provides a membership term
of longer than thirty-sbc (36) montlis.
F. The purchaser of a Health Spa Facility sliall replace the Seller as a party to any unexpired
Membership Contract and shall honor all Membership Contracts of the purchased facility in
effect at the time ofpurchase, pursuant to Section 13-23-5(2) of the Act In the event a Health
Spa Facility shall be sold under circumstances which will result in its closure and the purciiaser
shall not operate a Health Spa Facility within 15 miles thereof purchaser must notify Members
of such closure in writing within 10 days of the date of sale. Members may cancel their
outstanding Membership Contracts or may choose to continue their Membership Contract in
force. Notice of such election shall be in writing mailed to the purchaser within 30 days of the
receipt of notice of closure of the acquired Health Spa Facility.

R152-7-5. Rescission.
A. In the event a Health Spa Facility shall, for any reason, close, discontinue normal
operations or otherwise cease to do business while having outstanding obligations to provide
membership services to members iiolding valid membership contracts, the Health Spa Facility
must offer, in writing, to rescind all such membership contracts and to refund the unused portion
of all Member's membership fees. Such written offer of rescission shall establish the procedure
and tune limit for acceptance of the rescission offer and obtaining the desired refund.
B. An offer of rescission shall be made to each purchaser whose Membership Contract is valid
on the last day the Health Spa Facility is open for business. Tlie Health Spa Facility shall
provide the Division with a list of Membership Contracts valid on the date of closure within 10
business days ofsucli closure.
C Money to be refunded to members upon closure of a Health Spa Facility under these Rules
shall be placed in escrow with a bank or otherfinancialinstitution previously approved by the
Division. Such funds shall come from a Bond or Letter of Credit payable to the Division,
D Refunds shall be made to Members who submit claims within a time period to be
prescribed by the Division. Such refunds shall be made under the supervision of the Division
and shall, if insufficient funds are available for full refund, be made on a prorata basis based
upon the full amount due a claimant. The amount due shall be determined by multiplying the
number of months remaining on claimant's membership term as of the date of closure by the
monthly cost of such membership to the member at the time of purchase. Periods of less tlian
a full month shall be compensated by determining a daily cost of membership and multiplying
such daily cost by the number of unused membership days in such period.
E. Refunds shall be made to claimants within 90 days following the final date for submission
of claims in accordance with the procedures specified above.
F. Tlie Division may recover from the funds deposited in escrow pursuant to this Rule, its
costs, including investigative costs, processing costs, attorneys fees and other expenses related to
administration of rescissions made under these rules.
G. In the event there shall be funds remaining after full refund to all claimants and payment
of costs of the Division, such excess sliall be returned to Owners of the Health Spa Facility.
R152-7-6. Bond or Letter of Credit Required.
A Except as provided in Section 13-23-6, of the Act, all Health Spa Facilities shall be
covered by a performance Bond or Letter of Credit payable to the Division in an amount to be
determined by the number and cost of membersliip contracts sold by the Health Spa Facility.
B Originals or certified copies of such Bonds or Utters of Credit sliall be provided to the
Division not less than 10 days in advance of thefirstsale or attempt to sell made by any Health
Spa Facility. Annual renewals ofsucli Bonds or Letters of Credit shall be filed with the Division
at least 30 days in advance of expiration of existing Bonds or Utters of Credit.
C The Division shall have therightto approve or reject Bonds or Utters of Credit submitted
in compliance with this Rule. In the event a Bond or Letter of Credit is rejected by the
Division, the Health Spa Facility shall submit another within 15 days following notice by the
Division. In no event shall a Health Spa Facility conduct business without a Bond or Utter
of Credit in effect.
.
D. A Health Spa Facility which allows Bonds or Letters of Crcdt to expire without filing

renewal as provided herein, may be allowed, at the discretion of the Division, to register as a
new Health Spa Facility pursuant to the provisions of Rl5'2-7-4 and Rl52-7-6, hereof
R152-7-7. Enforcement.
A. Tlie Division may be entitled to recover costs, including investigative costs, processing costs,
attorneys fees and other costs incurred in administration of these ndes. Upon election of the
parties, payment ofsudi costs shall be made from the proceeds of the Bond or Letter of Credit.
B. Any payment made to the Division shall be approved by the Executive Director of the
Department of Commerce.
1990

63-46a-3
13-2-5
13-23-1,, et seq.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through the
DIVISION OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

BOYD L. JENTZSCH dba QUEST
SPORT & FITNESS, et al.
Defendants.
DAVID W.MILLER,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 950906098AA
Judge Anne M. Stirba

vs.

STATE OF UTAH, etal.
Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on April 10, 1997 on the
motions for summary judgment filed concurrently by the State of Utah, Salt Lake County,

and David W. Miller. Jeffrey S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General, appeared for and on
behalf of the State of Utah. Brendan P. McCullagh, Special Deputy County Attorney,
appeared for and on behalf of Salt Lake County. Duane R. Smith, appeared on behalf of
David W. Miller and also on behalf of the defendants, Homestead Insurance Company and
International Special Events & Recreation Association. Boyd L. Jentzsch was also present.

MFMOB ANPTTM DECISION
I . ITMTIISPUTED FACTS.

After reviewing the file, including the Stipulation filed with the Court on November
13, 1996, and the respective motions, memoranda, and affidavits of the parties, the Court
hereby finds that the following facts are undisputed:
1. From a time prior to January 1, 1993 until January 3, 1995, Boyd L. Jentzsch
("Jentzsch") d.b.a. Quest Sport & Fitness operated a health spa located at approximately
10300 South Redwood Road, South Jordan, State of Utah.1
2. On or about August 10,1994, Jentzsch signed and submitted to the Utah Division
of Consumer Protection (the "Division"), an application for a permit to operate a health spa
at 10300 South Redwood Road in South Jordan, Utah.2

'Memorandum in Support of Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment ("County Memo"),
p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, ^ I); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
("Miller Memo"), p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, f l ) .
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("State
Memo"), p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, f 1).

3. The Health Spa Permit Application identified Jentzsch as the owner of the health
spa facility operating under the name of Quest Sport & Fitness (hereinafter referred to as
"Quest").3
4. Neither Quest nor Jentzsch owned the facility located at 10300 South Redwood
Road, South Jordan, Utah wherein Quest provided health spa services to its members (the
"facility").4
5. The facility was owned by the Country Court House Trust who leased the same
to Quest "for the purpose of conducting thereon the business of a health club and for
incidental purposes related thereto

"5

6. Quest did not have any interest in the facility other than as a lessee thereof.6
7. The Division required Quest to obtain and provide to the Division a bond in the
sum of $50,000.00 in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5 (1990).7
8. On or about September 21,1994, Jentzsch submitted to the Division a Contractual
Liability and Financial Guaranty Coverage Agreement to serve as a bond under the Health
Spa Services Protection Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-23-1 (1991).8
'State Memo, p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, ?2).
*State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, f3); County Memo, p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, T2).
'County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 53); State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, ^4). See also Miller Memo,
p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, i|5).
•State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, \S); see also County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts. ^4).
'Miller Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, \2); County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, ^5).
•State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, J6).
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9. The Contractual Liability and Financial Guaranty Coverage Agreement
(hereinafter referred to as the "Bond") identifies Boyd Jentzsch (dba) Quest Sport & Fitness
as the "participating member" and identifies flic defendants, Homestead Insurance Company
and International Special Events and Recreation Association (hereinafter collectively referred
to as "Homestead"), as the insurers.9
10.

The Bond was effective for a term of one year, beginning on August 10,1994,

and required Homestead to pay to the Division up to $50,000.00 in the event of a default by
Jentzsch of his obligations under the Health Spa Services Protection Act.10
11.

In order to secure the Bond, Homestead required Quest to obtain the personal

guarantee of an individual acceptable to Homestead, which, in this case, was David W.
Miller.11
12.

Accordingly, David W. Miller executed a personal guarantee and indemnity

in order to allow the Bond to be issued.12
13.

With the Bond in place, Quest sold prepaid membership contracts to

consumers.13

•State Memo, pp. 3-4 (Uncontested Facts, f7).
,0

State Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 18).

"Miller Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 13); County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 16).
,2

Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 14).

"County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 17).

14.

Quest closed, discontinued normal operations, or otherwise ceased to do

business on or about January 3,1995 by virtue of actions taken by the bankruptcy trustee in
In re Quest Sport & Fitness, Inc., Case No. 93-23701.'4
15.

At the time Quest closed, discontinued normal operations, or otherwise ceased

to do business on January 3,1995, there existed and there now exists no less than $50,000.00
in outstanding obligations to Quest members holding valid, unexpired membership contracts
for health spa services.15
16.

The unexpired membership contracts at the time of closure were, for the most

part, one-year memberships with a few memberships extending no more than three years.16
17.

As a result of actions taken in the bankruptcy case, Quest members were denied

further access to the health spa facility.'7
18.

Quest did not provide an alternate location to Health Spa members holding

valid, unexpired membership contracts at the time Quest closed.18

,4

State Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 19); County Memo, p. 4 {Uncontested Facts, J10); see also Stipulation,
1 1 (filed with die Third District Court on November 13,1996). Compare Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 16)
and County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 18) with State's Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to
David W. Miller's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2 (Statement of Contested Facts, 11).
''State Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 110); Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 17). See County Memo,
p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 19); see also Stipulation, 1 2 (filed with the Third District Court on November 13,1996).
'•Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts; 110).
"County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, II1).
'•State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, 113).
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Within one week after closure of Quest, the Division notified Homestead, both

verbally and in writing, of Quest's default under the Act, which notification included a letter
dated January 6,1995 and received on January 9,1995. 19
20.

The Division has made demand upon Homestead to pay $50,000,00, payable

on a pro rata basis, to the holders of the unexpired membership contracts.20
21.

Neither Quest nor Homestead has submitted any funds for the purpose of

refunding the unused portion of membership fees paid by Quest members holding valid,
unexpired membership contracts at the time Quest closed.21
22.

The Country Court House Trust sold the facility to Salt Lake County on or

about June 15, 1995 after which Salt Lake County reopened the facility and provided the
same services as had been provided by Quest.22
23.

There are no references to health spa membership contracts in the purchase

agreement between the Country Court House Trust and Salt Lake County.23
24.

Salt Lake County has not filed a bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit

with the Division nor has the Division required Salt Lake County to do so 24
,9

State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, Jl 1).

^Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, J9).
^'State's Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, 512).
^County Memo, p 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1^12-13); State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, ^14); Miller Memo,
p. 4, (Uncontested Facts, ^8).
^County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, f 14).
24

County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 115); State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, ^15).

II. DECISION OF THE COURT.
Given the foregoing undisputed facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party, the Court concludes that there are no material issues of fact in
dispute and that the State of Utah and Salt Lake County are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Therefore, the Court grants the motions for summary judgment of the State of Utah
and of Salt Lake County and denies the motion for summary judgment of David W. Miller.
The Court's decision is based on the following grounds:
(1)

The Bond submitted by Quest and issued by Homestead satisfies the

requirements of Section 13-23-5(3) of the Act and was a valid, enforceable bond at the
time of Quest's closure.
(2)

Quest's closure on or about January 3,1995 and the absence of an alternate

health spa facility operated by Quest or its assigns within a 15-mile radius of the facility
created an obligation upon Quest to refund the unused portion of membership fees to all
members holding valid, unexpired membership contracts with Quest at the time of closure.
Utah Admin. R152-7-4 (1990).
(3)

The State is entitled to recover from Homestead the full amount on the

Bond ($50,000.00) by virtue of Quest's failure to refund the unused portion of membership
fees to all members holding valid, unexpired membership contracts with Quest at the time
of closure. Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5 (1991); Utah Admin. R152-7-5.C (1990).
7
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(4)

Rule 152-7-4.F of the Utah Administrative Code does not impose upon Salt

Lake County an obligation to honor the membership contracts of Quest in effect at the time
of the purchase of the facility on June 15,1995 for the following reasons:
(a) By definition, Salt Lake County is exempt from operation of the Act under
the clear and unambiguous language of Section 13-23-2 which provides that a health
spa does not include "any facility owned or operated by the state or its political
subdivisions." Utah Code Ann. §13-23-2(3)(b)(iv) (1991);
(b) Because administrative regulations may not extend beyond the scope of a
statute, the rules promulgated under the Act, Utah Admin. R152-7-1 et. seq.
(1990), are invalid to the extent they appear to impose obligations upon Salt Lake
County as a political subdivision of the State;
(c) Even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the
Act, Salt Lake County would not be required to assume the unexpired membership
contracts of Quest because Rule 152-7-4.F requires that the purchaser of the facility
replace "the Seller as a party to any unexpired Membership Contract;" the seller
in this case, however, was the Country Court House Trust, not Quest;
(d) Even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the
Act, under Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5(5) (1991), Homestead was not released from
its obligation under the Bond by virtue of the sale of the facility because (1) Quest
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had not refunded all unearned payments to consumers, and (2) Salt Lake County did
not file a new bond or letter of credit; and
(e) Even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the
Act, because the purchase of the facility occurred a full five (5) months after its
closure, the regulations governing closure of a facility applied rather than the
regulations governing the purchase of a facility.

JUDGMENT
NOW, THEREFORE, the Bond is forfeited and the plaintiff, State of Utah, is hereby
awarded judgment against Homestead in the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) for
the benefit of former Quest members who incurred damages as the result of Quest's going
out of business and subsequent failure to refund to its members the unused portion of their
membership fees. Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5 (1991).
Judgment is also awarded to defendants, State of Utah and Salt Lake County,
against plaintiff, David W. Miller, whose complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this fi day of Way, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

^l&DGE ANNE M. STIRBA

£<£&&?'%
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Third Judicial District Court JudgS
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Atftffeiey for DaviQ WTMiller, Homestead Insurance
Company, and the International Special Events
& Recreation Association

Brendan^. McCui
Attorney for Sal
ce County
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